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DLD-298 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                             
No. 08-2307
                            
RONALD A. WILLIAMS,
Appellant,
v.
SHARON SEBEK, Assistant Librarian; DANIEL P.
BURNS; BEN E. ANSELL; Lt. W. LEGGETT; I. TURCO,
Correction Officer; MORRIS HARPER, M.D.; STANLEY
FALOR, M.D.; FRED R. MAUE, M.D.; JEFFREY
BEARD, Secretary of the Department of Corrections; SCI
GREENE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE MEMBERS;
ED RENDELL, Governor of Pennsylvania; Captain
GRAINEY; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC.; AMERICA
SERVICE GROUP, INC.; CATHERINE MCVEY, Bureau of
Health Care Services, Inc.; MICHAEL CATALANO, Chairman
of Prison Health Services, Inc., Chairman President & CEO
of America Services Group; THOMAS JACKSON,
Deputy Superintendent; JOHN DOE I & II
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-01203)
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
   September 25, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
      The administrative grievance procedure for Pennsylvania inmates is codified in the1
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy Statement No. DC-ADM 804, entitled
"Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System."  The three steps in the Pennsylvania
grievance process are (1) initial review by the facility grievance coordinator of the
inmate’s grievance; (2) appeal of the initial review to the superintendent or regional
director; and (3) a final appeal to the Secretary’s Office.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
2
(Opinion filed November 17, 2008 )
                             
 OPINION
                            
PER CURIAM
Appellant Ronald A. Williams, a Pennsylvania state prisoner confined at the State
Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”), filed a civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, in United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against
numerous correctional officials, physicians at the prison, and Prison Health Services, Inc. 
Williams later filed an Amended Complaint, and the correctional defendants and medical
defendants both moved for summary judgment, properly supporting their motions with
affidavits and exhibits, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c), (e).  Williams opposed the motions by
submitting his own summary judgment motion.
The Magistrate Judge submitted a Report and Recommendation, in which she
carefully set forth the procedural history of Williams’ grievances at SCI-Greene.  See
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) prior to bringing suit).   She then determined that1
218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).  The uncontested record evidence showed that Williams
frequently failed to appeal his grievances to the final level of review.  Nevertheless, the
Magistrate Judge did not recommend dismissing any of Williams’ claims for
nonexhaustion.
      In November 2002, Williams was evaluated for the Hepatitis C treatment protocol2
and given psychiatric clearance for such treatment.  However, it did not immediately
commence, necessitating, in his view, the filing of a grievance.
      We note that, on February 20, 2003, the day after Williams’ final appeal was denied,3
Dr. Harper prescribed Pegasys and Rebetol (also known as Ribavirin) to treat his
Hepatitis C illness.  Williams received both drugs for the next twelve months.  (Medical
Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Dkt. #85, at ¶¶ 21-30.)
3
Williams filed Grievance No. 39392 against defendant Dr. Morris Harper complaining
about his complete failure to treat Williams’ Hepatitis C illness.   Williams appealed this2
Grievance to final review, and the appeal was denied on February 19, 2003.  The
Magistrate Judge thus concluded that his failure to treat claim was barred by the two-year
limitations period for civil rights claims, see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (state
statute of limitations applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
5524(2) (two-year limitation period applicable to personal injury actions), because he
signed and dated his complaint on August 23, 2005, and the events complained about in
Grievance No. 39392 necessarily occurred well before August 23, 2003.3
Continuing with Williams’ next claim, the Magistrate Judge found that he had
properly grieved, through Grievance Nos. 45331 and 45332, his claim that he was denied
access to a typewriter while in the Restricted Housing Unit.  However, the claim failed as
a matter of law.  Williams claimed a violation of his right to Equal Protection under the
      Capital inmates are confined in administrative custody due to their sentence while4
non-capital inmates primarily are confined due to their security risk to others inside the
institution.
4
laws insofar as the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) treats capital inmates better than
non-capital inmates confined to Administrative Custody when it comes to the use of
typewriters.  However, prisoners are not a suspect class, and thus the prison rule need
only be rationally related to a legitimate penological interest to survive an equal
protection challenge, F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
The DOC’s policy of granting capital inmates access to a typewriter while denying the
same access to inmates in Administrative Custody is rationally related to the legitimate
purpose of maintaining order and security within the prison.   4
The Magistrate Judge also reached the merits of Williams’ claims that defendant
Librarian Sharon Sebek violated his right of access to the courts by confiscating his legal
documents, and that Sebek and defendants Daniel Burns and Lt. W. Leggett retaliated
against him by issuing him a misconduct for falsifying documents.  Again, however, these
access to the courts claims failed as a matter of law, see Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.
403 (2002), because Williams failed to submit any evidence to identify what court action
was affected by the confiscation, and what remedy might be awarded as recompense that
would not be available in any other future litigation, id. at 415.  Williams’ retaliation
claim failed as a matter of law because, although he had engaged in constitutionally
protected activity and had been subjected to an adverse action (90 days in disciplinary
      Williams sent three documents to the library for copying.  When Sebek inspected5
them, she found that he had affixed by tape an old notary stamp with signature and state
seal on the documents to be copied, thus attempting to make them appear original.  Sedek
refused to copy the documents and confiscated them.  Williams was issued a misconduct
for Forgery and Possession of Contraband.  He was found guilty of Forgery and received
90-days disciplinary custody based on the hearing examiner’s review of the documents in
question.
5
confinement), he failed to submit any evidence to show that the protected activity was a
substantial motivating factor in the defendants’ decision to take the adverse action,
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).  He was in fact convicted of the
misconduct.5
The Magistrate Judge next addressed in great detail the merits of Williams’ claim
that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was
violated in connection with the treatment he received for an inguinal hernia.  In
September 2003, Williams was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia approximately three
centimeters in length.  Medical personnel monitored his condition from September 2003
to July 2004, and treated the hernia with a truss and pain medication.  When the hernia
eventually extended into the scrotum and Williams’ pain became serious, a surgical
consultation was approved.  Surgery was recommended, and one month later, on July 28,
2004, the hernia was surgically removed.  Williams fully recovered.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Williams’ allegations of inadequate medical
care did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).  To act with deliberate indifference is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of
6serious harm.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).  Allegations of negligence
and disagreements over medical judgment do not state an Eighth Amendment claim,
White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990), and Williams failed to submit any
evidence to support an assertion that the defendants acted recklessly in not surgically
repairing his hernia sooner.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge rejected on the merits Williams’ due process claims
concerning his misconduct and continued confinement in Administrative Custody on the
ground that, under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), protected liberty interests are
generally limited to freedom from restraint that “impose[] atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at 484, the
determination of what is “atypical and significant” is based upon the range of conditions
an inmate would reasonably expect to encounter, Asquith v. Dep’t of Corrections, 186
F.3d 407, 412 (3d Cir. 1999), and the 90 days of disciplinary confinement imposed as a
result of the misconduct did not violate a protected interest as defined by Sandin.  In
addition, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Williams’ continued confinement in
administrative custody (for five and a half years) did not require a remedy because the
record showed that he was receiving the required periodic reviews of his status by the
Program Review Committee, see Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000)
(confinement in solitary confinement of eight years duration was sufficiently atypical and
significant in its hardship to create protected liberty interest implicating procedural due
      The Magistrate Judge also rejected a groundless claim of a conspiracy.6
7
process guarantees but inmate received due process via periodic reviews and right to be
heard).6
Williams submitted Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, which the District Court considered and rejected.  In an order entered
on March 31, 2008, the District Court granted the correctional and medical defendants’
motions for summary judgment, and adopted the Report and Recommendation as the
Opinion of the Court.
Williams appeals.  Our Clerk granted him leave to appeal in forma pauperis and
advised him that his appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
Williams was invited to submit argument in writing and he has done so.  
We will dismiss the appeal as frivolous.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.  An appellant may prosecute his appeal without prepayment of the fees, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1), but the in forma pauperis statute provides that the Court shall dismiss the
appeal at any time if the Court determines that it is frivolous, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  An appeal is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or
fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  Our review of the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment is plenary and we must affirm if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Celotex
      The drugs Williams received for his Hepatitis C illness were discontinued by Dr.7
Stanley Falor on February, 23, 2004 because of the length of time Williams had been
receiving treatment and because he had an undetectable viral load.  Williams was
asymptomatic and clinically stable.  (Medical Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts, Dkt. #85, at ¶¶ 28-30.)  In his Objections, Williams argued that his
Hepatitis C claim was not time-barred because, on June 17, 2004, a blood test showed a
“resurgence” of the disease.  We note also that, on August 9, 2005, a Dr. Talabi noted that
Williams wanted to restart his Hepatitis C treatment.  At that time, Dr. Talabi did not
restart the medication.  Id. at ¶¶ 51-52.  Nevertheless, Williams’ timeliness argument
misses the mark.  If he experienced a recurrence of the disease in June 2004 as a result of
a treatment failure, and the defendants refused to treat that recurrence, then, under the
circumstances of his case, he would have a new claim, separated in time and arising from
a different set of facts, that would require him to file a new grievance relating to the
recurrence, and thereafter exhaust his administrative remedies to the final level of appeal. 
Having failed to do that, the claim would be subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
8
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).  We have carefully reviewed the motions
and the evidence, and conclude that there is no arguable basis in fact or law for
disagreeing with the Magistrate Judge’s summary judgment determinations, as approved
and adopted by the District Court.  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
322-23.  The Magistrate Judge properly analyzed and resolved Williams’ claims and the
District Court properly granted summary judgment to all of the defendants.   7
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
